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Weyerhaeuser Speeches and Interviews

Renewing Weyerhaeuser

Remarks by Steve Rogel, Chairman, President and CEO Weyerhaeuser Company, at Dean’s Breakfast, University of Washington Business School, Husky Union Building, West Ballroom, Second Floor, Seattle, Washington - 2/20/2002

Good morning and thank you for inviting me today. It’s always a homecoming when I return to the “U.” Nostalgia leads me to remember my undergraduate days here as filled with football games and falling leaves, though my brain reminds me they were years of hard work.

I’ve titled my remarks “Renewing Weyerhaeuser” because that’s largely what I want to talk about, but one might subtitle them “A Tale of Two Companies.”

Because of my time at Willamette Industries and Weyerhaeuser’s subsequent, successful campaign to acquire Willamette, you might look at this acquisition as a homecoming, too. More about that later.

In thinking about what’s happened in the four-plus years since the fall of 1997 – when I first considered leaving Willamette for Weyerhaeuser – I realized I could organize events in terms of five major decisions.

While all businesses are different, I hope you will find these decisions – and my thought processes around them – of some use. Fortunately, I believe these decisions have turned out to be correct, but one can never be sure in advance.

Now, what were the decisions?

  • First and most crucial to all subsequent events was my decision to leave Willamette for Weyerhaeuser.
  • Second was my decision to keep the existing senior management team at Weyerhaeuser in place.
  • Third was the decision, along with that team, to develop a new business model and culture for the company.
  • Fourth was our decision to embark upon a program to consolidate and streamline Weyerhaeuser’s businesses and all support functions, such as human resources, information technology and finance.
  • And fifth was our decision that we needed to grow both to survive and to prosper in a rapidly consolidating industry.

To proceed in order, why would I leave Willamette for Weyerhaeuser? I was 55, two years in the CEO’s chair at Willamette, 25 wonderful years with Willamette.

I can’t deny there was a little bit of ego involved. After all, Weyerhaeuser was three times as large as Willamette with a much greater presence within the industry.

It was also flattering to be recruited by Jack Creighton, my predecessor at Weyerhaeuser and someone I greatly respected.

Taking the Weyerhaeuser job also was a chance to return to my home state – and, of course, be closer to my alma mater.

But the predominant motivation was simply that I had accomplished all I could at Willamette. It was such a well-run company that I sometimes viewed myself as little more than a caretaker. I jumped at the opportunity for a new and larger challenge.

If you can imagine Willamette as a Swiss watch, then Weyerhaeuser was an elegant, if somewhat out-of-time, grandfather clock. To mix metaphors a bit, through the 80s, Weyerhaeuser had been referred to as a “slumbering giant.” Some had even begun terming the entire forest products industry a “dinosaur.”

To rebut these descriptions, Jack Creighton reminded the Seattle Chamber of Commerce in 1992 that dinosaurs had lasted 150 million years. “We genuinely believe,” he added, “that because of Weyerhaeuser’s forestry practices, our trees can ‘go on forever.’”

Indeed, if there’s one thing Weyerhaeuser can do in a world-class way, it can grow trees – a remarkable, renewable and recyclable natural resource.

But back when Jack spoke to the Chamber, Weyerhaeuser was just emerging from a lengthy and failed flirtation with diversification, a hot business trend of the 70s and 80s.

Would you believe that by the end of the 1980s, Weyerhaeuser owned a pet-supply business? How about gardening supplies … hand lotions … salmon ranching … hydroponic lettuce … even an artificially-preserved, indoor-tree business? Some of these businesses were not as bizarre as they sound and actually made money. But some were just bizarre.

By this time, Jack and Chairman George Weyerhaeuser had learned that a large company like Weyerhaeuser could not afford to spread its human and financial capital across such a broad range of businesses.

That’s why they began a process to refocus Weyerhaeuser on its core businesses … those based on trees and the wood and paper products that could be made from them.

When I arrived at Weyerhaeuser in 1997, diversification had itself gone the way of the dinosaurs. But an equally daunting task awaited.

Over time, Weyerhaeuser’s businesses had become too strong and independent relative to the corporation. It would be fair to say Weyerhaeuser had become a holding company of independent, self-contained businesses.

A great deal of work remained to achieve Weyerhaeuser’s potential.

Guess who would have that privilege? Indeed, it was a condition of my employment. Weyerhaeuser’s board of directors was determined that the company’s existing structure and culture be changed. It was just too disjointed, causing problems such as duplication of staff and a myriad of often conflicting policies, programs and systems.

To borrow from Ford Company, “job one” was to pull Weyerhaeuser together into one company.

I came aboard with the mandate to accomplish these tasks, as well as to increase our speed, simplicity and decisiveness.

Perhaps this is why the Japanese call being a CEO a “10,000 aspirin job.” Believe me, there are times you wonder whether you can accomplish all you’ve set out to do … which reminds me of something Pope John the 23rd once wrote.

“It often happens,” he said, “that I wake up at night and begin to think about a serious problem and decide that I must tell the Pope about it. Then I wake up completely and remember that I am the Pope.”

Of course, I knew what the Weyerhaeuser board expected and, obviously, I took the job. That led to my second decision. What should I do with the existing set of senior leaders I inherited – a group of seven?

If I had taken the conventional path, I might have made some changes, if not for the assurance of loyalty, then for the purpose of sending a clear message there was a new guy in town.

Well, I try not to be a slave to convention. Besides, it didn’t take me long to realize Weyerhaeuser’s senior leaders – even those who had aspired to the CEO job – were first and foremost loyal to the company.

They really wanted the best for Weyerhaeuser – and they were bright, committed and experienced. Keeping all of them was not a difficult decision, although work needed to be done to meld them into a cohesive team.

With the senior leadership in place, but not yet a team – and after a pre-announced, six-months’ learning period – I was ready to tackle the job of uniting Weyerhaeuser.

That led to the third decision. At our first senior team retreat, I set the following task: Create a template on one sheet of paper that would identify the few key processes necessary to manage Weyerhaeuser as a single entity, including goals and hard measures. I said we would stay until we got it done. It took two days.

Now you might think this was a recipe for disaster – two days to create a new business model for a large corporation. It turned out accomplishing this task was easier than it sounds.

To guide us, we already possessed a core set of values from the earliest days of Weyerhaeuser and a vision developed during Jack Creighton’s regime. That vision was to be the best forest products company in the world.

The hard part was agreeing on a small group of standard, companywide processes from the plethora of those within our businesses and staff functions. We finally arrived at eleven key companywide processes, including how to operate safely …how to develop and execute superior strategy … how to manage and develop our people … and how to team profitably with our customers.

A few processes – including the way we manage our capital expenditures and how we leverage the purchase of our goods and services – were already under development.

We called the resulting one-page charter our Roadmap for Success – and it has gone a long way toward unifying our company. But the Roadmap alone couldn’t eliminate all the inconsistencies and waste associated with operating a collection of disparate, though related, businesses.

There was still the issue of duplication of support policies, programs and staff at our unit, business, sector and corporate levels.

While we’d pulled our businesses together through the Roadmap, we hadn’t done the same with our staff-support functions. This led to the fourth decision – to embark upon a process to consolidate and streamline our support services. We call it Support Alignment. We began it early in 1999.

Obviously, if you eliminate duplication of work, you eliminate positions. While some leaders approach the challenge of downsizing by setting some arbitrary percentage of jobs to be cut, I felt doing so was neither the effective nor humane way to proceed.

Rather, I believed that the people in both the businesses and the staff groups that served them were the best judges of how to provide needed support services more cost-effectively.

So we formed a series of cross-functional, cross-business teams … a diagonal slice of the company for each function. These teams were charged with reviewing each staff function – human resources, information technology, finance, some 12 functions in all – and recommending improvements to the senior management team. This review included benchmarking the best performers in each function across American industry.

Support Alignment was led by the people of the company – no consultants were involved –and I’m pleased to say that the senior management team accepted almost all the review teams’ recommendations as delivered.

After a year, the work of the review teams was completed and we moved on to implementation. We’re now two full years down the road and by the end of 2001, Support Alignment has achieved ongoing, annual savings of 100 million dollars.

Finally, the fifth decision: to grow the company. Growing a company while changing it is taking on quite a load – and it’s a load for all employees, not just me. However, we’re not the only company that’s facing such a challenge. In today’s business world, it goes with the territory.

Why was I so set on growing Weyerhaeuser? You need to know that the forest products industry is one of the most fragmented of all industries.

One result of this fragmentation has been a historical series of boom-and-bust cycles where periods of healthy prices for our products have only served to entice industry members to add new capacity. And this is an industry where one new paper mill – costing upwards of a billion dollars today – can change the global demand-and-supply equation.

With new Asian companies moving into the pulp and paper business, these business cycles have plateaued into constant overcapacity – too much product, not enough buyers. The result has been lower prices, falling margins.

At the same time capacity was growing, our channels to market were changing. Small, geographically limited, customers were turning into large, national and/or international customers.

Think Home Depot, Lowe’s, Office Depot, Staples. These customers wanted to do business with a single or, at most, a few large national suppliers.

Industry consolidation was just a matter of time – and it’s in full flood now. Weyerhaeuser’s acquisition of Willamette is just the latest in a series of major consolidations in our industry, both here and abroad. Whether these consolidations will lead to a greater balance of supply and demand over time remains to be seen, but that’s the operating premise. The early returns are promising.

Another factor in favor of consolidation are the low market capitalizations companies in our industry have been accorded by investors. In fact, our whole industry totals less than half a percent of the S&P 500.

With the rise of huge mutual and pension funds, companies with small market caps became relatively illiquid – that is, major buys and sells by these large funds could significantly drive their share prices up or down. Big investors don’t like that, so they tend to avoid small-market-cap stocks, depressing their value.

A company with less than 20 billion dollars in market capitalization falls into this unfavorable camp. In our industry, only one company is large enough to escape it – and it isn’t us.

With the industry consolidating and with many companies’ market caps depressed, I feared Weyerhaeuser would become a possible takeover target. So, from the standpoint of both offense and defense, I believed we needed to grow.

And grow we have. A couple years ago, we had fewer than 40,000 employees. With Willamette, we will have more than 63,000. But the size of one’s work force is hardly the measure of a corporation’s financial health.

In terms of sales, we’ve grown from a 10-billion dollar-company to one that should realize sales of 19 billion dollars this year, even in a down market. More importantly, I believe we’re now well positioned to deliver the kinds of returns our investors expect and deserve as the economy recovers.

What are the major acquisitions Weyerhaeuser has made during my tenure? There have been four:

  • In 1998, we purchased a fine paper mill, a couple sawmills and some timberlands in Canada from Bowater.
  • In 1999, we purchased MacMillan Bloedel, one of Canada’s largest forest products companies.
  • Early last year, we bought Trus Joist International, the global leader in engineered wood products.
  • And, just this month, we completed the purchase of Willamette Industries.

I suspect you’re curious about the Willamette acquisition.

Here’s why we did it:

  • The “hand in glove” fit of our combined assets will make us number one, two or three in the world in our timberlands, wood products, containerboard and fine paper businesses.
  • The combination also creates the opportunity to better use our assets and lower costs in these businesses. In fact, we project the deal will generate 300 million dollars in annual synergies, or efficiency savings.
  • Weyerhaeuser and Willamette share complementary management strengths and cultures. We can learn from Willamette. Willamette can learn from us.

In addition, both companies are Northwest forest products companies with praiseworthy histories and value systems, including ethics. Weyerhaeuser was founded in 1900, Willamette in 1906, and both have grown successfully over many decades.

You may be wondering if I had the idea of acquiring Willamette already in mind when I took the Weyerhaeuser job. The answer is complicated.

Let me just say that the idea of combining Weyerhaeuser and Willamette had been around for a long time at both companies. That’s right – each had discussed buying the other.

That brings me up to the present. The challenge now is to integrate the two companies into one highly effective and profitable team.

The early returns are in. We’re already gaining synergies in our first two weeks as a combined company! As well, teams from both companies are working together cooperatively and with an eye to achieving our goal – creating the global forest products leader.

I have every confidence we will succeed. But that’s the subject for a future speech.

At any rate, I’ve been up here talking long enough. Now I’m going to give your ears a rest – and mine some exercise – by taking any questions you may have.